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Abstract
Using a large linked employer-employee data set, this paper studies the
extent to which employers insure workers against transitory and permanent
firm-level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether
the amount of wage insurance depends on the nature of industrial relations.
Adopting the identification strategy proposed by Guiso et al. (2005), it is
shown that wage insurance is particularly apparent for individuals subject to
collective wage agreements. While collective contracts alone are sufficient to
fully insure workers against transitory shocks in small plants, they provide
only partial insurance in medium-sized and large plants. At large employers,
the joint existence of collective contracts and works councils helps to provide
full insurance against transitory shocks, but provides only partial insurance
against permanent shocks. This finding is consistent with the amount of
insurance against permanent shocks being constrained by the possibility of
considerable job losses and bankruptcy.
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Non-technical summary: Drawing on a large-scale German Linked Employer-
Employee data set, this paper studies the extent to which employers insure workers
against firm-level shocks. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether
trade unions and works councils facilitate risk-sharing contracts between workers and
firms. Given that the extent of insurance should critically depend on the frequency
of the shock, we adopt the identification strategy proposed by Guiso et al. (2005),
which enables us to distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks.
In addressing the role of collective bargaining coverage for the amount of wage
insurance, our results offer a remarkably consistent picture. Wage insurance is found
to be particularly apparent for employers who are subject to collective wage agree-
ments. Moreover, the ability of collective contracts to provide wage insurance ap-
pears to decrease with plant size. While in small plants (plant size ≤ 100 employees)
collective contracts are sufficient on their own to fully insure workers against transi-
tory shocks, they provide only partial insurance in medium-sized (100 < plant size
≤ 500) and large plants (plant size > 500). At large employers, the joint existence of
collective contracts and works councils helps to provide full insurance against tran-
sitory shocks, but provides only partial insurance against permanent shocks. This
finding supports the view that the amount of insurance against permanent shocks
should be constrained by the possibility of job losses and bankruptcy. The estab-
lished differences across size classes provide some support for the notion that the
degree of information asymmetries is likely to increase with firm size. This should
render full insurance under collective contracts at medium-sized and large employ-
ers much more difficult and may therefore require the additional existence of a local
worker representation. The fact that the latter succeeds in insuring workers only at
large employers is consistent with works councils having more formal information
rights in large plants.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze: Die vorliegende Studie geht der Frage nach, in
welchem Ausmaß Bescha¨ftigte von ihren Arbeitgebern gegen firmenspezifische Pro-
duktivita¨tsschocks versichert werden. Im Mittelpunkt des Interesses steht hierbei
die Frage, inwiefern die Existenz von Tarifvertra¨gen sowie Betriebsra¨ten das Ausmaß
der Versicherung beeinflusst. Da die Fa¨higkeit von Arbeitgebern, Bescha¨ftigte gegen
persistente Schwankungen zu versichern, erheblich durch mo¨gliche Insolvenzrisiken
restringiert sein sollte, unterscheidet die Analyse explizit zwischen permanenten und
transitorischen Schocks. Auf Basis deutscher Linked Employer-Employee Daten
wird hierzu die von Guiso et al. (2005) vorgeschlagene Identifikationsstrategie
angewendet, die eine Identifikation der jeweiligen Reagibilita¨ten von Lo¨hnen auf
kurz- und langfristig wirkende Schocks erlaubt.
Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung liefern deutliche Evidenz dafu¨r, dass Tar-
ifvertra¨ge eine erhebliche Versicherungsfunktion einnehmen, da die individuelle Ent-
lohnung in tarifgebundenen Betrieben sta¨rker auf Produktivita¨tsschocks reagiert als
die Entlohnung in nicht-tarifgebundenen Betrieben. Die Versicherungsfunktion von
Tarifvertra¨gen ha¨ngt jedoch erheblich von der Betriebsgro¨ße ab: In kleinen Be-
trieben (bis zu 100 Bescha¨ftigten) fu¨hrt die Tarifbindung zu einer vollsta¨ndigen
Entkopplung der Entlohnung von kurzfristigen Produktivita¨tsschocks, wa¨hrend dies
in mittleren (zwischen 100 und 500 Bescha¨ftigten) und großen Betrieben (mehr als
500 Bescha¨ftigte) nicht der Fall ist. In großen Betrieben kann die zusa¨tzliche Exis-
tenz von Betriebsra¨ten jedoch dazu beitragen, eine vollsta¨ndige Versicherung gegen
kurzfristige Schocks zu gewa¨hrleisten. Die Hypothese, dass kurzfristige Schocks mit
Hilfe von Tarifvertra¨gen und Betriebsra¨ten vollsta¨ndig, langfristige Fluktuationen
hingegen nur partiell versichert werden, kann zumindest fu¨r die Gruppe der gro¨ßeren
Betriebe besta¨tigt werden. Das Ergebnis, dass in mittleren und großen Betrieben
Tarifvertra¨ge allein keine vollsta¨ndige Versicherung gegen kurzfristige Fluktuatio-
nen gewa¨hrleisten ko¨nnen, ist mo¨glicherweise auf unterschiedlich große Information-
sasymmetrien zuru¨ckzufu¨hren, deren Beseitigung einer lokalen Arbeitnehmervertre-
tung bedarf. Dass Betriebsra¨ten dies jedoch nur in großen Betrieben gelingt, ist
konsistent damit, dass Betriebsra¨te gema¨ß dem Betriebsverfassungsgesetz in großen
Betrieben mehr Informationsrechte besitzen.
1 Introduction
The fact that entrepreneurs may insulate workers’ earnings from shocks in the prod-
uct market has long been recognised as an important determinant of the dynamics
of wages. The rationale for such an insurance ultimately rests on the concept of
implicit labour contracts originated by Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and Gordon
(1974). A central empirical implication is that contract wages may entail implicit
payments of insurance premiums by workers in favourable states of nature and the
receipt of indemnities in unfavourable states.
In the past two decades, a great deal of empirical work has attempted to quan-
tify the extent to which workers’ wage dynamics reflect insurance contracts. Early
studies date back to Gamber (1988) who uses aggregate U.S. industry-level data.
Subsequent work relying on individual data has focused on the question to what
extent individuals’ wages are affected by external labour market conditions. While
much of this work is concerned with aggregate shocks1, the increasing availability of
firm-level and linked employer-employee data has enabled researchers to address the
responsiveness of wages to firm-specific conditions. Studies of this sort include e.g.
Arai (2003), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and van Reenen (1996). The firm-level
focus provides a more appropriate framework for studying insurance contracts since
- due to their idiosyncratic nature - firm-specific as opposed to aggregate shocks
constitute diversifiable, and therefore insurable risks. Within the firm-level frame-
work, the methodology has been recently considerably refined by Guiso et al. (2005).
Based upon the notion that the extent of insurance should critically depend on the
frequency of the shock, the authors propose an identification strategy that aims
at explicitly distinguishing between the reaction to transitory and permanent firm-
level demand shocks. Using Italian linked employer-employer data, their empirical
results suggest that employers provide full insurance against transitory and only
partial insurance against permanent shocks. The latter finding is consistent with
1The evidence by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) indicates that workers’ wages depend on the
tightest labour market conditions since a worker was hired, thereby providing empirical support
for an implicit contract framework with worker mobility (for similar evidence see also Grant 2003).
Devereux (2005) and Weinberg (2001) also use individual level data and examine the responsiveness
of wages to industry-level demand shocks.
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the amount of insurance against permanent shocks being constrained by the possi-
bility of bankruptcy. Since then some other authors have replicated their strategy
for other European countries. The evidence by Cardoso and Portela (2009) yields
similar results for Portugal, whereas the results of Ka´tay’s study (2008) points to
considerably less insurance in Hungarian firms.
While much of this recent literature has focused on how the amount of insurance
varies across different worker and employer groups, the role of collective bargaining
has received somewhat less attention.2 The scant evidence on collective bargaining
is particularly surprising as the role of trade unions as an insurance device has
long been emphasised by researchers. The general argument here is that union
may mitigate the enforcement problems that arise within risk-sharing agreements
between workers and their employers (e.g., Horn and Svensson 1986, Malcolmson
1983). Clearly, examining the trade unions’ role in providing wage insurance is
crucial to an understanding of how labour market institutions affect wage dynamics.
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to explore whether trade unions
facilitate risk-sharing contracts between workers and firms. To do so, we adopt the
identification strategy proposed by Guiso et al. (2005) for the case of Germany. The
German labour market is particularly interesting as it is characterised by institu-
tions that are widely thought to impose substantial restrictions on the flexibility of
wages. A salient feature of the German labour market is the system of widespread
collective bargaining coverage. Within this system, regional and industry-wide wage
agreements rank among the most important contract type. Moreover, the German
labour market is characterised by the coexistence of different wage determination
structures, which enables us to exploit these variations to compare outcomes under
different bargaining regimes. Recent empirical evidence for Germany shows that
centralised contracts decrease the responsiveness of individual wages to firm profits
as compared with firm-level contracts and uncovered firms, thereby providing some
support for insurance contracts (Guertzgen 2009). As the identification strategy by
2E.g., Guiso et al. (2005) and Cardoso and Portela (2005) address the observability of effort
as well as individual risk aversion, while Devereux (2005), Grant (2003) and Weinberg (2001) look
at gender-specific differences. While Cardoso and Portela (2009) consider wage insurance under
firm-level and centralised contracts, they do not compare covered and uncovered firms.
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Guiso et al. allows for a distinction between transitory and permanent shocks, we
expand on this previous work and examine whether the amount of insurance varies
with the frequency of the shock. Given the union’s role in facilitating risk-sharing
arrangements between workers and their employers, the first natural expectation is
that collective wage contracts provide workers with full insurance against transitory
shocks at the firm level. As such a full insurance is likely to induce substantial job
loss if shocks have a more permanent character, the second hypothesis to be tested
is that collective wage contracts should allow for a response to persistent demand
shocks.
The data we use to address these questions are taken from a large-scale matched
worker-firm data set for Germany, the IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set
(LIAB). This data set links the IAB-Establishment Panel with individual data for
the entire population of workers from the Employment Statistics Register. Due to
its administrative nature, one of the major advantages of this data set is that it
offers very reliable information on individual daily wages inclusive of supplemental
pay as long as such pay is subject to social security contributions. Moreover, the
data are especially well suited for our purposes as they offer longitudinal information
on value added, collective bargaining coverage at the establishment level as well as
information on a number of worker and firm characteristics. The latter are partic-
ularly important to filter out any systematic variation in workers’ wages and firms’
value added in order to isolate shocks to firm performance and workers’ earnings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a theoretical
and institutional background discussion of how the nature of industrial relations
may be expected to affect the extent of wage insurance at the firm level. Section
3 presents the empirical analysis. While Section 3.1 to 3.4 provide a description of
the data set and a discussion of the basic identification strategy, Section 3.5 and 3.6
present the empirical results. The final Section 4 concludes.
3
2 Unions and Wage Insurance
2.1 Theoretical Background
The idea that firms may insulate workers’ earnings from demand shocks has been
formalised by the literature on optimal, or implicit labour contracts (Azariadis 1975,
Baily 1974, and Gordon 1974).3 At the heart of this approach is the view that, due
to its long term nature, a labour contract may involve considerable risk-sharing and
intertemporal utility smoothing aspects. In these models, differences in risk aversion
provide the main theoretical determinant of the amount of insurance provided by
the entrepreneur. A general prediction is that, if workers are sufficiently more risk
averse than employers, wages will fluctuate less as compared with a pure spot market
situation. A major drawback of this approach, however, is that optimal contracts
typically require individual workers to have access to an unreasonable amount of
information about the technological and product market conditions their employ-
ers are confronted with. This apparent deficiency has been taken up by a number
of authors who have integrated ideas from the theory on optimal labour contracts
with trade union theory. In general, this strand of literature emphasises the trade
union’s informational role in providing workers with more accurate information on
the relevant state of nature and rendering implicit contracts feasible. Models of this
sort include the studies by Malcolmson (1983), Horn and Svensson (1986) as well as
Hogan (2001). Among these authors Malcolmson (1983) was the first to argue that
under product market uncertainties unions may enable workers to enforce state-
contingent efficient contracts by removing information asymmetries and imposing
collective action upon the employer within an efficient bargaining framework. A
similar view is expressed by Horn and Svensson (1986), who consider the union’s in-
formational role by combining a monopoly-union set-up with risk-sharing contracts.
While the former models identify product market demand shocks as the main source
of contracting difficulties, the contribution by Hogan (2001) introduces employers’
incentives to cheat on implicit contracts striving to encourage effort provision as the
main workers’ contracting concern.
3For an overview see e.g. Rosen (1985) and Malcolmson (1999).
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A second channel through which collectively bargained wages might promote
wage insurance relates to the level of wage bargaining. If wages are determined
at sectoral or national levels, this should open up less possibilities for local wage
adjustments as compared with firm-level wage bargaining. Taken together, the
overall view that emerges from these considerations is that collective bargaining
may act as a substitute for legal contractual enforcement and may therefore serve
as a device to promote implicit contractual arrangements when legal enforcement is
otherwise unavailable.
2.2 Institutional Background
As in many other European countries, German wage determination is dominated by
collective bargaining agreements. Such collective contracts are generally negotiated
between industry-specific trade unions and employers’ associations. While legally
binding on all member firms of the employers’ association and on all employees who
are members of the trade union, member firms generally extend the wage settle-
ment to the non-unionised labour force as well. The decision to join an employers’
association and to apply such a centralised agreement is generally left to the firms’
discretion. An exception is if an agreement is declared to be generally binding by the
Federal Ministry of Labour in which case centralised wage contracts may also apply
to non-member firms and their employees. Further, there are voluntary extension
mechanisms, i.e. firms without any legally binding agreement may voluntarily ap-
ply a centralised industry agreement. Finally, a minor fraction of non-member firms
are engaged in bilateral negotiations with a trade union and conclude firm-specific
agreements. In 2004, the fraction of establishments with a legally binding industry-
wide contract was 41 per cent, whereas the fraction of establishments covered by a
firm-level contract was 2 per cent in western Germany.4 Even though industry-level
bargaining may be still be viewed as the predominant form of wage determination,
the past two decades have seen a clear tendency towards more flexible wage-setting
at the firm level. The reason is that contractual opt-out or hardship clauses have
become a widespread element of centralised agreements. While opt-out clauses dele-
4Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations. The figures are reported for 2004, since
our data span the time period 1995 to 2004.
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gate issues that are usually specified in the central agreement, such as working-time
and pay-conditions, to the plant level, hardship clauses enable firms to be exempted
from the centralised agreement if they are close to bankruptcy. Moreover, since bar-
gained wages in centralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages,
there is also sufficient scope for upward flexibility which is reflected in a major
fraction of covered firms paying wages above the collectively agreed rates.
In Germany, works councils constitute the second important pillar of the in-
dustrial relations system and provide workers with the opportunity of employee
representation at the establishment level.5 The participation rights are laid down
under the German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and include
consultation, co-determination and information rights, which generally increase in
scope the larger the establishment becomes. For example, Section 106 of the Works
Constitution Act obliges plants with more than 100 employees to set up a so-called
economic committee in order to provide works councils with all relevant information
about their business conditions. According to Section 100, employers with more
than 1,000 employees are more formally obliged to do so by recording the required
information within each annual quarter. As to wages, even though works councils
are formally prohibited from negotiating over issues that are normally dealt with in
collective bargaining agreements, they are widely recognised to have a substantial
impact on wages for several reasons. First, works councils are traditionally involved
in the implementation of collective bargaining agreements at the establishment level
and have a consent right with respect to the placement of workers in certain wage
groups. Second, works councils may also be expected to play a crucial role in local
negotiations over the payment of wages above the collectively agreed rates. Third,
since the adoption of opt-out clauses within centralised wage contracts generally
requires the approval of the collective bargaining parties and union membership
among works councils is typically very high, works councils are also likely to be
actively engaged in implementing flexibility provisions at the plant level.6
5While being legally mandatory in all establishments with at least 5 employees, a local worker
representation of this kind only takes institutional form if workers initiate a works council election.
6For a more detailed description of the German industrial relations system see Guertzgen (2007).
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2.3 Expected Insurance Heterogeneity
As noted in Section 2.1, the trade unions’ and works councils’ role in removing
information asymmetries leads us to expect covered firms and those with a works
council to provide more insurance than uncovered firms.
When comparing industry-level with firm-level contracts, it is worth emphasising
that the latter are concluded by industry-specific unions. I.e., firm-level contracts
in Germany merely involve a different level of bargaining, but do not reflect a fun-
damentally different union structure. Thus, with respect to the trade union’s role in
removing information asymmetries, there is a-priori no reason to expect any differ-
ential effects under firm and industry-level contracts, as the collection of the relevant
firm information ought to be equally easy to deal with under either contract type.
The distinctive feature that is relevant here apparently relates to the level of wage
determination. To the extent that industry-level wage bargaining makes contracts
contingent on sectoral conditions, one might expect the amount of wage insurance
to be stronger under centralised contracts as compared with firm-level contracts.
However, as a large fraction of firm-level contracts in Germany simply adopts wage
bargains negotiated in the corresponding industry agreements (”Anerkennungstar-
ifvertra¨ge”), the overall differential effect is not clear-cut a-priori.
Clearly, a straightforward implication of wages being determined by sectoral
conditions would be that industry-level contracts offer little scope for adjustments of
individual wages to firm-specific demand shocks, even if the latter are of permanent
nature. However, as demonstrated in Section 2.2, industry-level contracts do not
necessarily provide an obstacle to the adjustment of wages to local conditions, as
recent decentralisation tendencies in Germany have introduced the option of making
such wage adjustments. Given that full insurance is likely to induce substantial job
loss if demand disturbances have a more permanent character, a natural expectation
is that this potential should at least have been exploited to allow for reactions to
permanent firm-level demand shocks.
Given that opt-out clauses allow for wage adjustments even under centralised
bargaining, centralised contracts on their own - i.e. without any additional local
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worker representation - are less likely to provide full wage insurance the larger the
degree of information asymmetries at the firm level. The reason is that full in-
surance would require an industry-level union’s knowledge about the technological
and product market conditions a single employer is confronted with. In general,
one might expect the degree of information asymmetries to increase with the size
of the employer. A further hypothesis to be tested, therefore, is that the ability of
centralised contracts to provide wage insurance should decrease with firm size and
that full insurance at larger employers should require the additional existence of a
local worker representation.
Because larger firms are much more likely to be covered by collective bargaining
contracts and works councils, a closely related issue concerns the independent role
of firm size in providing wage insurance. As firm size is typically viewed as a good
proxy for capital market access (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist 1994), insurance contracts
should be particularly apparent for individuals working at larger employers. In
our empirical analysis, we will therefore explicitly attempt to sort firm size from
industrial relations explanations using evidence on differential effects of collective
bargaining across size classes. When addressing this issue, two conflicting hypotheses
can be tested. First, it might be conceivable that due to their better credit market
access large firms provide more wage insurance than smaller firms irrespective of
their collective bargaining status. A countervailing hypothesis is that collective
bargaining coverage is used as an explicit device to provide wage insurance and that
large firms who choose to stay uncovered might not want to commit themselves to
wage insurance and provide no more wage insurance than their smaller counterparts.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The data used in this paper are taken from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee
Panel (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the
Employment Statistics Register (see Alda et al. 2005). The IAB-Establishment
Panel is based on an annual survey of German establishments, whose sampling
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frame encompasses all German establishments that employ at least one employee
paying social security contributions. New establishments are added to the survey
every year to incorporate births and to correct for panel mortality and exits in order
to preserve the panel’s representative character. The individual data stem from the
Employment Statistics Register, which is an administrative data set based on reports
from employers in compliance with the notifying procedure for the German social
security system. This procedure obliges employers to provide a notification at the
beginning and the end of each employment relationship for all employees who are
covered by the German social security system. In addition, there is at least one
annual compulsory notification on the 31st December of each year.
To construct the linked employer-employee data set, we first select establish-
ments from the establishment panel data. From the available waves, we use the
years 1995 to 2005. Since information on a number of variables, such as investment
expenditures and sales are gathered retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose
information on the last wave. Moreover, we restrict our sample to western Ger-
man establishments from the mining and manufacturing sector with at least two
employees. From the establishment level data we gain information on a number of
establishment characteristics, such as establishment size, collective bargaining cov-
erage and the existence of a works council. To capture technological differences, we
also construct a measure for the capital-labour-ratio. Following Guiso et al. (2005),
we use per-capita value added as a proxy for demand shocks, which is constructed
as the (per-capita) difference between annual sales and material costs. Table A1 in
the appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of the establishment
variables. From the establishment data, we first construct a sample in order to iden-
tify value added shocks at the plant level. As we apply dynamic panel data methods
to identify these shocks, this sample comprises establishments with consistent infor-
mation on the establishment characteristics of interest and at least three consecutive
annual time-series observations. The resulting sample contains 1,354 establishments,
yielding an unbalanced panel containing 6,332 establishment-observations with, on
average, 4.7 years of data.
In a second step, we merge the establishment panel data with individual data for
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the entire population of workers who are employed by the selected establishments
by using a unique establishment identifier, which is available from both data sets.
In particular, the data allow us to merge the selected establishment data with no-
tifications for all employment spells comprising the June 30th of each year. Similar
to Guiso et al. (2005), we select our sample so as to focus on stable employment
patterns. To do so, we exclude observations for apprentices, part-time and home-
workers as well as workers younger than 19 and older than 55 from the individual
data. We further eliminate those individuals who move between sample establish-
ments, in order to exclude workers with multiple employers over the observation
period.7 Moreover, since we consider only full-time workers, we eliminate those
whose wage is less than twice the lower social security contribution limit. In order
to apply dynamic panel data methods we keep those workers who are tracked over
at least three consecutive time periods. The resulting sample comprises 435,556 in-
dividuals in 1,263 establishments with a total of 2,153,723 individual observations.
The individual data provide information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, na-
tionality, employment status (blue/white-collar), educational status (six categories)8
and on the date of entry into the establishment. Since there is an upper contribu-
tion limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are top-coded. In our
sample, top-coding affects 14 per cent of all observations. Following Gartner (2005),
right-censored observations are replaced by imputed wages. The latter are randomly
drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are constructed by the
predicted values from Tobit regressions and whose (lower) truncation point is given
by the contribution limit to the social security system. Table A2 in the appendix
contains a more detailed description of the individual characteristics gained from
the Employment Statistics Register.
7For those workers who separate and do not move between sample establishments, our data
unfortunately lack information on their subsequent employment status.
8The categories are: No degree, vocational training degree, highschool degree (Abitur), high-
school degree and vocational training, technical college degree and university degree. Missing
and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described
in Fitzenberger et al. (2006). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that
individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
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3.2 Modelling Shocks to Firm Performance
Following Guiso et al. (2005), we isolate idiosyncratic shocks to firm performance
by modelling firm performance according to the following process:
(1− ρL) · yjt = Z ′jt · γ + ϕj + εjt, (1)
where yjt is the log of per-capita value added in establishment j at time t, which
has been deflated by a sector-specific producer price index. L is the lag operator,
and the parameter ρ is intended to capture the extent of autroregressive predictable
dynamics in the evolution of yjt. In order to control for aggregate non-idiosyncratic
shocks, Z
′
jt includes a full set of time dummies.
9 To capture variation in value
added due to changes in capital-input, Z
′
jt contains as a further control the plant-
specific (log) capital-labour ratio. ϕj is a plant-specific fixed effect and εjt reflects
the shock to value added against which firms may insure their employees. Taking
first-differences of eq. (1) sweeps out the plant-specific fixed effect and yields:
(1− ρL) ·∆yjt = ∆Z ′jt · γ +∆εjt, (2)
In eq. (2), first differencing causes the lagged dependent variable ∆yjt−1 to become
correlated with the error term ∆εjt, so that it is necessary to instrument lagged value
added. In the absence of second-order correlation in the error term, yjt−2 and earlier
lags provide suitable instruments, since they do not correlate with ∆εjt. The same
is true for other endogenous variables in ∆Z
′
jt which are likely to be correlated with
the differenced error term. To estimate eq. (2), we apply the differenced Generalised
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
This estimator exploits all available moment conditions around the error term as
specified above. Apart from instrumenting endogenous and lagged dependent vari-
ables by their lagged values in t − 2, the GMM estimator provides an appropriate
treatment of predetermined variables which are assumed to be uncorrelated with εjt
and εjt+1, but are correlated with εjt−1. These are typically variables whose values
in subsequent time periods later than t are likely to be affected by value added in
9Other aggregate shocks may be represented by industry-specific and regional dummies. How-
ever, the latter are time constant in our data set and are captured by the establishment fixed
effect.
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period t. As first differencing causes such variables to become correlated with the
error term ∆εjt, they are instrumented by lagged values in t − 1 and earlier. To
test the validity of the moment conditions, we present the J-Test (generalised Sar-
gan/Hansen test) of overidentifying restrictions. This test statistic calculates the
correlation of the error terms with the instrument matrix and has an asymptotic
χ2 distribution under the null that the moment conditions are valid. Moreover, we
report diagnostics for second and (higher)-order serial correlation of the error terms
(testing the null of no serial correlation).10
Table 1 reports the results from the GMM regressions, using yjt−2 and yjt−3 as
instruments for lagged value added. The estimate of ρ is 0.301 with a standard error
of 0.066. Moreover, the log of the capital-labour ratio enters the equation with a
positive and significant sign. The capital-labour ratio and the time dummies are
treated as exogenous variables. A difference Sargan/Hansen test confirms the addi-
tional moment restrictions as compared to a specification that treats these variables
as predetermined (with a p−value of 0.23). Overall, the test statistics in Table 1
indicate that the specifications pass the test of overidentifying restrictions and the
AR(2)-Test, thereby confirming the validity of the instruments.
Table 1: Value added GMM regressions
Variable Coefficient Standard error
∆log Value added(t− 1) 0.301∗∗∗ (0.066)
∆log K/L 0.301∗∗∗ (0.085)
Year dummies (χ2(k), p−value) 28.57 (8 ) 0.000
J -Test (χ2(k), p−value) 17.65 (20 ) 0.610
AR(2)-Test (p−value) 0.373
AR(3)-Test (p−value) 0.862
Observations (Plants) 3,624 (1,354)
Note: The dependent variable is log (per-capita) value added. Results
are reported for the one-step GMM estimator. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. ∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
10Note that the GMM estimator may also help to reduce a potential endogeneity problem that
arises from measurement error. Measurement error is likely to be relevant since value added and
the capital-labour ratio are constructed using the employment level. Thus, measurement error in
this variable can induce spurious correlations between the capital-labour ratio and the dependent
variable.
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In a second step, we use the residuals from the GMM estimations in order to
construct a consistent estimate of ∆εjt. Table 2 reports estimates of the autoco-
variances E(∆εjt,∆εjt−τ ) of the differenced error terms. The figures show that
there appears to be no statistically significant correlation at lags greater than one,
confirming again the validity of the instruments used in Table 1.
Table 2: Autocovariance structure of value added GMM residuals








The table reports estimates of the autocovariances
E(∆εjt,∆εjt−τ ) along with their standard errors.
Data are pooled over all years.
∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Following Guiso et al. (2005), we specify the error term εjt as the sum of a tran-
sitory and a permanent shock, where the latter is assumed to follow a random walk
process. We further assume that the transitory shock follows an MA(q)-process,
whose order may be recovered from the autocorrelation structure of ∆εjt. From Ta-
ble 2 it can be seen that the estimates of the autocovariances at lags greater than one
provide evidence of no large and statistically significant autocorrelation. This leads
us to conclude that the autocorrelation structure is in line with an MA(1)-process
of ∆εjt and an MA(0)-process of εjt. A representation of εjt that is consistent with
the data is therefore
εjt = ζjt + υ˜jt, (3)
with ζjt denoting the permanent component which follows a random walk process
ζjt = ζjt−1 + u˜jt, (4)
and υ˜jt representing the transitory component which follows anMA(0)-process. We






υ˜ and E(u˜jtu˜js) = E(υ˜jtυ˜js) = 0 for s 6= t as
well as E(υ˜jtu˜js) = 0 for all s, t. As ∆εjt ∼ MA(1) even in the absence of a random
13





) = 0. The latter condition amounts to testing the null that
∆εjt = ∆υ˜jt against the alternative that ∆εjt = u˜jt + ∆υ˜jt.
11 On the basis of the
estimated residuals ∆εjt this hypothesis can be rejected (with a p-value < 0.001).
Based upon the established representation of the error term εjt, value added
may be decomposed into a deterministic component, Djt, a permanent, Pjt, and a
transitory shock, Tjt, such that
yjt = Djt + Pjt + Tjt, (5)
where Djt = (1−ρL)−1(Z ′jt ·γ+ϕj), Pjt = (1−ρ)−1ζjt and Tjt = (1−ρL)−1[υ˜jt−
(1− ρ)−1ρ · u˜jt]. First-differencing eq. (5) and pre-multiplying by (1− ρL), eq. (2)
can be rewritten as
(1− ρL) ·∆yjt = ∆Z ′jt · γ + (1− ρL) · ujt +∆υjt, (6)
with ujt = (1− ρ)−1u˜jt and υjt = υ˜jt − (1− ρ)−1ρ · u˜jt denoting the innovations
to the permanent and transitory components in eq. (5).
3.3 Modelling Shocks to Individual Earnings
Workers’ earnings are modelled according to the following process:
lnwijt = X
′
ijt · δ + αPjt + βTjt + φi + ψijt, (7)
with i = 1,..., N individuals and a total of N∗ =
∑
Ti total worker-year obser-
vations. j refers to the establishment which employs individual i at time t. The
dependent variable, lnwijt, is the individual log gross daily wage. The explanatory
variables consist of a vector of covariates, X ′ijt, with a coefficient vector δ. X
′
ijt in-
cludes individual and plant-level characteristics (including those captured by Djt)
as well as time dummies in order to filter out any systematic variation in workers’
wages. To model the dependence of earnings on stochastic shocks to firm perfor-
mance, the permanent as well as transitory shocks to value added, Pjt and Tjt,





σ2u˜ (see also Meghir and Pistaferri 2004).
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from eq. (5) are assumed to enter the wage equation with parameters α and β,
respectively. Finally, φi denotes an individual unobserved effect, whereas ψijt repre-
sents a time-specific error term that is unrelated to any idiosyncratic shocks to firm
performance.
On the basis of eq. (5), eq. (7) can be rewritten as
lnwijt = X
′
ijt · δ + α · (1− ρ)−1ζjt + β · (1− ρL)−1υjt + φi + ψijt. (8)
First-differencing and pre-multiplying eq. (8) by (1− ρL) gives:
(1− ρL)∆ lnwijt = (1− ρL)∆X ′ijt · δ + α · (1− ρL) · ujt + β ·∆υjt + (1− ρL)∆ψijt
= (1− ρL)∆X ′ijt · δ +∆ωijt. (9)
Similar to eq. (2), eq. (9) is estimated by applying the Generalised Method of Mo-
ments by Arellano and Bond (1991). X ′ijt includes individual covariates such as age
and tenure, a quadratic in age and tenure, qualification levels, employment status,
as well as the log of plant size and the capital labour ratio. The choice of the instru-
ments for the lagged dependent variable depends on the autocorrelation structure
of the differenced error term ∆ωijt. Because the AR-Tests indicate that ∆ωijt and
∆ωijt−3 are serially uncorrelated, the differenced lagged wage is instrumented using
lagged values in t − 3 and t − 4. The log of plant size and the capital-labour ratio
are treated as endogenous variables and are instrumented by lagged values in t− 2
and t− 3.
Table 3 displays the results from the individual earnings GMM estimations. The
estimate of the autoregressive coefficient is 0.130 with a standard error of 0.008.
With some exceptions, the remaining covariates enter the equation with their ex-
pected sign and are significant at conventional levels. Finally, Table 4 reports es-
timates of the autocovariances E(∆ωijt,∆ωijt−τ ), where ∆ωijt is constructed from
the estimated differenced residuals from eq. (9). The figures show that - except at
lag six - there appears to be no large and statistically significant correlation at lags
greater than 2, confirming the validity of the instruments used in Table 3.
As the autocorrelation structure of ∆ωijt is consistent with an MA(2)-process,
a representation of ψijt that is consistent with the data is
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Table 3: Individual wage GMM regressions
Variable Coefficient Standard error







∆Vocational training 0.006∗∗ (0.003)
∆Vocational training + highschool 0.010∗∗ (0.004)
∆Technical college 0.110∗∗∗ (0.010)
∆University 0.111∗∗∗ (0.012)
∆log Plant size 0.074∗∗∗ (0.006)
∆ K/L 6.71e−06 (8.30e−06)
∆Industry-level contract (Cent) 0.008∗∗∗ (0.001)
∆Firm-level contract (Firm) -.002∗∗ (0.001)
∆Works council 0.026∗∗∗ (0.000)
Year dummies (χ2(k), p−value) 7748.04 (7 ) 0.000
J -Test (χ2(k), p−value) 8770.09 (46 ) 0.000
AR(2)-Test (p−value) 11.78 0.000
AR(3)-Test (p−value) -0.81 0.419
AR(4)-Test (p−value) 1.22 0.222
Observations (Individuals) 1,250,755 (435,556)
Note: The dependent variable is the log daily wage. Results
are reported for the one-step GMM estimator.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
Table 4: Autocovariance structure of wage GMM residuals








The table reports estimates of the autocovariances
E(∆ωijt,∆ωijt−τ ) along with their standard errors.
Data are pooled over all years.
∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
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ψijt = ϑijt + ξijt, (10)
with ϑijt representing a permanent component following a random walk process
ϑijt = ϑijt−1 + µijt, (11)
and ξijt denoting a transitory component following an MA(0)-process.
3.4 Identification
In this section, we look at the relationship between the residual component of indi-
vidual wage growth, ∆ωijt, and the shock to firm performance, ∆εjt. By virtue of
eq. (9), ∆ωijt may be specified as
∆ωijt = α · (1− ρL) · ujt + β ·∆υjt + (1− ρL)∆ψijt. (12)
According to this representation individual wages may respond differently to the
transitory and permanent component of firm-specific shocks. As we do only observe
a consistent estimate of ∆εjt, i.e. the sum of (1− ρL) · ujt and ∆υjt, identification
of α and β requires orthogonality conditions for the residuals of the equations
∆ωijt = β ·∆εjt (13)
and
∆ωijt = α ·∆εjt. (14)
Subtracting β ·∆εjt from eq. (12), we obtain
∆ωijt − β ·∆εjt = (α− β) · (1− ρL) · ujt + (1− ρL)∆ψijt. (15)
It can be shown that
E(∆εjt+1,∆ωijt − β ·∆εjt) = 0, (16)
i.e. in a regression of ∆ωijt on ∆εjt, ∆εjt+1 and any power [∆εjt+1]
k with k ≥ 1 may
serve as an instrument for ∆εjt to identify the parameter β, since it is uncorrelated
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with the residual in eq. (13) and correlated with ∆εjt, since E(∆εjt+1,∆εjt) =
−σ2υ˜.12
Correspondingly, under the assumption of covariance stationarity and using the








,∆ωijt − α ·∆εjt) = 0. (17)
Hence, all terms of the form (
∑1
τ=−1∆εjt+τ )
m with m ≥ 1, may be used as an
instrument for ∆εjt to identify the parameter α.
3.5 Results
We begin by presenting workers’ and firms’ autocovariances as well as worker-firm
cross covariances in Panel A of Table 5 for the matched worker-establishment sam-
ple. The estimated values for the moments of the shocks to value added are similar
to those reported in Table 1, which are based on the full sample of establishments.
From the estimated cross covariances one can see that there appears to be no signif-
icant correlation between shocks to workers’ wages and establishments’ value added
for the full sample. The estimated value of E(∆ωijt,∆εjt) is 0.0002 and not statisti-
cally different from zero. The point estimate of E(∆ωijt,∆εjt−1) is even smaller and
is also very imprecisely estimated. Panel B reports estimates of α and β based upon
the identification strategy described in Section 3.4. As we use the first three powers
of the instruments described in the previous section, we have two overidentifying
restrictions for each equation.13 To estimate α and β we adopt the feasible efficient
GMM procedure since the Pagan-Hall-statistic consistently rejects the null of ho-
moskedastic error terms (see also Baum et al. 2003). In Panel B, the estimate for β
is 0.011 with a standard error of 0.008. The estimate for α is even negative (with a
point estimate of -.0091) and is not statistically significant either (with a standard
error of 0.034). In both specifications, the generalised Sargan tests of overidentify-
12Note that ∆εjt−1 does not serve as an instrument as ujt−1 enters eq. (13). The same is true
for lags greater than one since they do not correlate with ∆εjt (see Table 2).
13Note that we lose some further observations as we use appropriate lags and leads to construct
the instruments described in Section 3.4.
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Table 5: Responsiveness of wages to value added shocks
A. Autocovariances
Workers’ Firms’ Worker-Firm
Autocovariances Autocovariances Cross Covariances
E(∆ωijt,∆ωijt) S.E. E(∆εjt,∆εjt) S.E. E(∆ωijt,∆εjt) S.E.
0.0127 (0.0012) 0.2997 (0.0266) 0.0002 (0.0009)
E(∆ωijt,∆ωijt−1) S.E. E(∆εjt,∆εjt−1) S.E. E(∆ωijt,∆εjt−1) S.E.
-.0061 (0.0008) 0.1513 (0.0244) 8.0e−05 (0.0007)
B. Instrumental Variable Estimates
Transitory Shock (β) Permanent Shock (α)
Sensitivity to shock 0.0111 (0.0081) -.0091 (0.0335)
J -Test ( p−value) 0.255 0.337
F -Test ( p−value) 0.000 0.000
Observations 872,778 581,900
The dependent variable is ∆ωijt, which is regressed on ∆εjt using the instruments as des-
cribed in the main text. Standard errors (S.E.) are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering
at the establishment level. ∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
ing restrictions (J-Test) fail to reject the null hypothesis that the models are not
misspecified. (with p-values of 0.255 and 0.337, respectively). Also, the low p-values
of the F -Tests confirm that the excluded instruments are jointly significant in the
first-stage regressions.
As discussed earlier, capital market access and industrial relations considerations
suggest that the extent of insurance might differ systematically by firm size. To
test this notion, we split up the sample into workers employed by small (less than
or equal to 100 employees), medium-sized (between 100 and 500 employees) and
large (more than 500 employees) establishments. The choice of the smallest size
class is motivated by the discussion from Section 2.2, which suggests that works
councils’ information rights are relatively weak in these plants.14 Panel A of Table 6
presents estimates of the worker-firm cross covariances for the different size classes.
The figures strongly indicate that our failure to find evidence of significant cross
14In line with the discussion from Section 2.2, one would ideally choose plants with more than
1,000 employees as the largest size class. However, among these plants all employers without
collective contracts are covered by a works council, making it impossible to infer the differential
insurance effect of works councils versus uncovered plants from our sample establishments.
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Table 6: Responsiveness of wages to value added shocks across size classes
A. Cross covariances Across Size Classes
Worker-Firm Small Medium Large
Cross Covariances Size ≤ 100 100 < Size ≤ 500 Size > 500
E(∆ωijt,∆ωijt) 0.0023
∗∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0024∗∗ (0.0006) -.0002 (0.0009)
B. IV Estimates Across Size Classes
Small Medium Large
Explanatory Variable Transitory Shock (β)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
∆εjt 0.0070
∗∗ (0.0036) 0.0051 (0.0040) 0.0085 (0.0117)
J -Test ( p−value) 0.980 0.395 0.440
F -Test (p−value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exogeneity-Test (p−value)
Observations 17,312 98,656 756,810
Explanatory Variable Permanent Shock (α)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
∆εjt 0.1103 (0.1154) -.0665 (0.0544) -.0030 (0.0326)
J -Test ( p−value) 0.962 0.649 0.276
F -Test (p−value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exogeneity-Test (p−value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 9,726 57,142 515,032
The dependent variable is ∆ωijt, which is regressed on ∆εjt using the instruments as des-
cribed in the main text. Standard errors (S.E.) are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering
at the establishment level. ∗∗significant at 5%-level, ∗∗∗significant at 1%-level.
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covariances appears to be the result of different patterns across size classes:
While for large employers the estimated moment is negative and not statistically
significant, small and medium-sized establishments exhibit significant and positive
cross covariances (with point estimates of 0.0023 and 0.0024, respectively). Panel
B reports the results from estimating the IV regressions. For small establishments,
the response to transitory shocks, parametrised by β, is estimated to be positive
and is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (with a point estimate of 0.0070
and a standard error of 0.0036). The estimates for medium-sized and large firms,
in contrast, are also positive but not statistically significant. Referring to the lower
part of Panel B, the estimate for α exhibits its expected sign for small plants, but
has a very large standard error. In all specifications, the J-Tests confirm the validity
of the moment restrictions. Correspondingly, the F -Tests show that the instruments
have sufficient explanatory power in the first stage regressions. Overall, the results
for the different subsamples show that there appear to be different patterns of wage
insurance against transitory shocks in smaller and larger establishments.
We now address the implications of different types of industrial relations for the
extent of wage insurance across different size classes. Table A4 in the appendix re-
ports descriptive statistics tabulated by size classes. The figures show that compared
with small plants a much larger fraction of medium-sized and large establishments
is covered by collective contracts as well as works councils. In order to investigate
whether the insignificant responses in Table 6 are driven by suppressed differen-
tial industrial relations effects, Table 7 reports results from including interactions
between ∆εjt and dummy variables representing the existence of an industry-level
(CENT ), a firm-level contract (FIRM) and a works council (WCOUNCIL), re-
spectively. The set of instruments is extended by adding the interactions between
the original instruments and the respective indicator variables. Referring to the
estimates for β in columns (1) and (3) in Table 7, the figures show that industry
as well as firm-level contracts appear to suppress the response of workers’ wages to
transitory shocks in small and medium-sized plants. While the baseline responses in
uncovered plants are positive and significant at conventional levels, the coefficients
on the interaction terms are estimated to be significantly negative. For both small
21
and medium-sized plants, a Wald test fails to reject the null that the overall effect is
zero for both contract types (with p-values of 0.387 and 0.724 for industry-level and
0.384 and 0.438 for firm-level contracts, respectively). Interestingly, among medium-
sized plants, works councils appear to have no differential impact on the extent of
insurance as the interaction terms are consistently found to be insignificant. This
contrasts sharply with small and large plants (Column (5)), where the interaction
term of works councils enters the equation with a negative and highly significant
coefficient. In column (5), the interaction effect of works councils is more precisely
estimated than the (negative) interaction terms of centralised and firm-level con-
tracts. Moreover, a Wald test of β = −β CENT − β WCOUNCIL confirms the
hypothesis that the overall effect is zero (with a p-value of 0.903).
Turning to the responses to permanent shocks in columns (2), (4) and (6), the
figures reveal that among medium-sized and large plants, the insignificant estimates
of α from Table 6 are also driven by differential collective bargaining effects (Columns
(4) and (6)). This contrasts with small plants, for whom the coefficients for α and
its interactions with collective bargaining do not exhibit their expected sign and are
found to be insignificant (Column (2)). In uncovered medium-sized plants (Column
(4)), individuals’ wages are found to respond positively to permanent shocks (with
a significant point estimate of 0.088). The coefficients on the interaction term of
industry-level contracts and works councils show that these institutions appear to
significantly reduce the sensitivity of wages to permanent shocks. The same is
true for large plants (Column (6)), where the estimate of α for uncovered plants
is considerably larger (with a significant point estimate of 0.521). A Wald test
of α = −α CENT shows that in medium-sized plants centralised contracts are
sufficient on their own to suppress the responsiveness to permanent shocks. At large
employers, in contrast, only the joint existence of works councils and industry-level






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to compare the responses to transitory and permanent shocks, we also
perform an exogeneity test for our regressors, which is based upon the difference in
the J-statistic from a model where the regressors are assumed to be exogenous and
an alternative model where they are taken as endogenous (see Baum et al. 2003).
This test can also be taken as an indirect test for the equality of all coefficients
across the models identifying α and β. As the p−values from these difference tests
are 0.138, 0.128 and 0.183 for small, medium-sized and large plants, respectively,
we are not able to formally reject the null that the responses to transitory and
permanent shocks do not significantly differ from each other. However, given that
the p−values still border significance for small and medium-sized plants, we prefer
to present separate estimates for α and β. Finally, it is worth mentioning that all
specifications pass the J−Test of overidentifying restrictions with sufficiently large
p-values. Further, as we have multiple endogenous regressors, the terms in brackets
report the partial R2 of the reduced form regressions (see Shea 1997). The figures
show that in all cases the power of the instruments is sufficient to identify the
parameters of interest.
Taken together, the estimates indicate that - consistent with our expectations
- collective contracts in small and medium-sized plants seem to provide full insur-
ance against transitory shocks. Somewhat unexpectedly, a similar result holds for
insurance against permanent shocks in medium-sized plants. Moreover, in large
plants who are neither covered by a collective contract nor by a works council the
sensitivity of wages to shocks is considerably more pronounced than in their small
and medium-sized counterparts, with the differences in the coefficients for α and
β across size classes being statistically significant. While in large plants collective
bargaining coverage alone fails to provide full insurance, the joint coverage by a
collective contract as well as a works council helps to fully insure workers against
either type of shock.
Thus far, we have only considered insurance heterogeneity induced by different
industrial relations. To check whether the pattern of results derived in Table 7 is
robust to the inclusion of further interactions, we next turn to the implications of the
risk sharing literature that (i) the amount of wage insurance should decrease with the
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sensitivity of firms’ performance to workers’ effort (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1997),
(ii) increase with the individuals’ degree of risk aversion and (iii) increase with the
variability of value added as an inverse measure for the precision of the signal on
workers’ effort (see also Guiso et al. 2005). To do so, we include interactions between
∆εjt and dummy variables taking on the value of unity for white-collar workers and
skilled individuals, whose effort might be expected to be more relevant to firms’
performance than that of their blue-collar and low-skilled counterparts. As to risk
aversion, the individual data lack explicit information on workers’ risk preferences.
Recent evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel suggests that risk aversion is
generally higher among females and increases significantly with age (Dohmen et al.
2005). As a proxy for risk aversion, we therefore include interactions between ∆εjt
and age as well as a dummy for female workers for whom we expect the amount of
insurance to be larger. To measure differential effects with respect to the variability
in firm performance, we include also an interaction between ∆εjt and the standard
deviation of log real value added over each plant’s observation period.
The results from including these additional interactions are shown in Table 8.
Overall, the results for these interactions appear to be somewhat mixed, as the
estimated coefficients exhibit their expected sign only in some few specifications.
For example, while the female interactions enter with their expected (negative) sign
in columns (1), (2) and (6), the coefficients are estimated to be significantly positive
in columns (3) and (5). The same is true for skilled workers, whose wages are
found to be more responsive to transitory shocks only in large plants. A similar
picture emerges for white-collar workers who receive less wage insurance in small
and large plants only. In a similar vein, the coefficient on the interaction between
the variability in value added enters with a negative significant sign only in column
(6).
Despite this mixed picture, the clear pattern that emerges from Table 8 is that
the inclusion of the additional interactions appears to preserve the industrial relation
pattern found in Table 7. In small firms, both contract types are found to provide full
insurance against transitory shocks (Column (1)). On the contrary, the coefficients
for α and its industrial relations interactions are again found to be insignificant
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(Column (2)). In medium-sized and large firms, centralised contracts suppress the
responsiveness of wages to transitory shocks - but not to a full extent as a Wald test
of β = −β CENT can be rejected at conventional levels (Columns (3) and (5)).
The interaction term of works councils is negative, but insignificant in medium-
sized plants. This contrasts with large plants, where the interaction terms enters
the equation with a significantly negative sign. Even though in large plants the
overall response is estimated to be negative (with a point estimate of -0.06 and -0.01
under industry and firm-level contracts), this result supports the view that both
contract types along with works councils helps to suppress a positive responsiveness
of wages to transitory shocks at large employers. The coefficients on the interaction
terms of firm-level contracts in medium-sized plants do not alter their sign, but are
estimated with much less precision. Compared with centralised contracts, the role of
firm-level contracts seems to be confined to wage insurance against transitory shocks
at smaller and large employers. Similar to centralised contracts, firm-level contracts
on their own fail to provide full insurance against transitory at large employers as a
Wald test rejects the null of β = −β FIRM with a p-value < 0.001 in column (5).
The result that - compared with smaller plants - collective contracts at medium-
sized and large employers do not succeed in insuring workers against transitory
shocks is supportive of the notion that the degree of information asymmetries is
likely to increase with plant size. This should render full insurance under collec-
tive contracts at medium-sized and large employers much more difficult and may
therefore require the additional existence of a local worker representation. The fact
that the latter are able to insure workers against transitory shocks only at large em-
ployers (compare Columns (3) and (5)) is perfectly consistent with works councils
having more formal information rights in larger plants (see Section 2.2). Note that
this result does not hold for insurance against permanent shocks in medium-sized























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A possible explanation for this result may relate to the fact that permanent
as opposed to transitory shocks are easier to monitor. As a result, despite their
weaker information rights, works councils in medium-sized plants might be equally
successful in dealing with these shocks as compared with their counterparts at large
employers.
Comparing the results with those from Table 7, a further important differ-
ence concerns the insignificant interaction terms for α under firm and industry-
level contracts and the considerably smaller interaction effect for works councils
in large plants (Column (6)). This latter finding suggests that once differences in
the amount of insurance according to different individual and employer character-
istics are taken into account, collective contracts along with works councils at large
employers still provide partial insurance, but fail to provide full insurance against
permanent shocks. This result contrasts sharply with medium-sized plants where
collective contracts alone succeed in fully insuring workers against permanent shocks
(Column (4)). This latter result is somewhat counterintuitive since we expected the
amount of insurance against permanent shocks to be constrained by the possibility
of considerable job losses and bankruptcy. While the established differences across
medium-sized and larger plants might either reflect different preferences for employ-
ment or, alternatively, differences in the amount of information asymmetries, our
data unfortunately do not allow us to favour either of the two explanations.
3.6 Robustness Checks - Comparison to other Estimates
In this section we conduct some robustness checks and compare our findings to pre-
vious results from the literature. As a first restriction, we have excluded all workers
who move between sample establishments over the observation period from our es-
timation sample. To check whether this exclusion biases our results, we reestimated
the model after including these movers in our sample. The results corresponding
to those in Table 8 are shown in Table A5 in the appendix. For the sake of expo-
sitional brevity we confine the presentation to the industrial relations interactions.
Even though the inclusion of movers leads to less precise estimates of α in medium-
sized plants, the pattern of results is very similar to that in Table 8. Exceptions are
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firm-level contracts in medium-sized plants (centralised contracts in larger plants),
which now significantly reduce the sensitivity of wages to transitory (permanent)
shocks. Overall, the baseline point estimates in small and large uncovered plants
are somewhat larger than those in Table 8. Even though the differences are not sta-
tistically significant, this finding may be taken as weak evidence that movers might
be less risk averse than stayers.
A second concern is that we had to impute wages for those workers whose wages
are top-coded. To assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to top-coded
wage observations, we re-ran the specifications from Table 8 excluding the obser-
vations with imputed wages. The results are shown in Table A6 in the appendix.
Even though the estimates of α in medium-sized plants perform somewhat unsat-
isfactorily, the figures again corroborate the pattern of results that has been found
earlier. Exceptions are firm-level contracts in medium-sized and large plants whose
interaction effects for α are estimated with more precision. Further, compared with
the estimates from Table 8, the baseline point estimates of α and β in uncovered
plants turn out to be somewhat smaller - but again not significantly so. A possi-
ble explanation for the lower point estimates might relate to the fact that workers
with top-coded wage observations are characterised by a larger amount of observed
and unobserved productivity. As a result, employers’ performance should be more
sensitive to the effort of workers whose wages are top-coded, thereby giving rise to
a more pronounced responsiveness of wages to value added shocks for this group.
Taken together, the above exercises lead us to conclude that the overall pattern of
results is fairly robust to the inclusion of movers as well to the exclusion of workers
with censored wage information.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our results to other estimates from the lit-
erature. Using Italian data, Guiso et al. (2005) find an elasticity of wages to per-
manent shocks ranging from 0.05 to 0.09, while Cardoso and Portela (2009) report
an estimate of 0.09 for Portugal. Both studies find full insurance against transitory
shocks. Katay’s (2008) results, in contrast, point to a somewhat larger responsive-
ness of wage to permanent as well as transitory shocks in Hungary, as the author’s
estimates of α (β) range from 0.07 to 0.12 (0.04 to 0.06). Compared to these figures,
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our estimated value of α for uncovered medium-sized firms is within a similar range
(0.07-0.08), whereas our estimates of α and β for large uncovered firms are rather
on the high side. However, it needs to be emphasised that - except for Cardoso and
Portela (2009) - the cited studies do not allow the elasticity to vary with collective
bargaining coverage and firm size. Thus, our findings for large uncovered firms may
reflect the fact that large firms who choose to stay uncovered might not want to
commit themselves to wage insurance and provide even less wage insurance than
their smaller counterparts.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Drawing on a large-scale Linked Employer-Employee data set, this paper studies
the extent to which employers insure workers against firm-level shocks. Particular
emphasis is given to the question of whether the amount of wage insurance depends
on collective bargaining coverage. Adopting the identification strategy proposed by
Guiso et al. (2005), the analysis distinguishes between transitory and permanent
shocks. In addressing the role of collective bargaining coverage for the amount of
wage insurance, our results offer a remarkably consistent picture. Wage insurance is
found to be particularly apparent for employers who are subject to collective wage
agreements. Moreover, the ability of collective contracts to insulate workers’ wages
from shocks appears to decrease with plant size. While in small plants collective
contracts alone are sufficient to fully insure workers against transitory shocks, they
provide only partial insurance in medium-sized and large plants. At large employ-
ers, the joint existence of collective contracts and works councils helps to provide
full insurance against transitory shocks, but provides only partial insurance against
permanent shocks. Note that this finding is consistent with the amount of insur-
ance against permanent shocks being constrained by the possibility of job losses and
bankruptcy. The established differences across size classes provide some support for
the notion that the degree of information asymmetries is likely to increase with firm
size. This should render full insurance under collective contracts at medium-sized
and large employers much more difficult and may therefore require the additional
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existence of a local worker representation. The fact that the latter help to insure
workers particularly at large employers is consistent with works councils having more
formal information rights at large employers. In sorting firm size from collective bar-
gaining explanations, we find that large uncovered employers provide even less wage
insurance than their smaller counterparts. This lends support to the hypothesis
that employers use collective bargaining coverage as an explicit device to provide
wage insurance and that large firms who choose to stay uncovered might not want
to commit themselves to wage insurance.
Finally, there are potential directions for future research. The established in-
sensitivity of wages to permanent shocks in medium-sized plants raises particular
concerns about employers’ ability to adjust to shocks in the long run. Future research
should address the question as to how the heterogeneity in insurance translates into
different amounts of job creation and destruction. A closely related issue concerns
the probability of plant closure. As full insurance against permanent shocks holds
the risk of bankruptcy, further investigations should go into the long-run employment
effects and explore whether a less pronounced responsiveness of wages to permanent
shocks is associated with a larger risk of plant closure.
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Value added Value added is constructed by subtracting material costs from annual
sales. Per-capita values are obtained by dividing by average establishment
size. The latter is calculated by averaging the number of employees
for the month June over the present and preceding year.
Nominal values are deflated by the sector-specific producer
price index obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office, which
is merged to the data based upon a two-digit sector classification.
K/L Constructed by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the
Capital -labour ratio capital value in the first observation year and using the information on
expansion investments. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing
investment expenditures in each establishment’s first observation year
by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g, and a depreciation rate
of capital, d .*) Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by
adding real expansion investment expenditures. Nominal investment
expenditures are deflated by the producer price index of investment goods
of the Federal Statistical Office Germany. The capital-labour ratio is con-
structed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size.
Works council Dummy=1 if works council is present. In some years (1995 and 1997)
only those plants who enter the panel are asked to report the existence
of a works council. For the remaining establishments the missing
information is imputed based upon the information in the following year.
Firm-level contract Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by a firm-specific agreement.
Industry-level contract Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by an industry-specific agreement.
Note: *) To calculate the capital stock in the first period, we set d=0.1 and g=0.05.
Table A1: Construction of establishment variables from the IAB-Establishment Panel
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Variable Definition
Gross daily wage Reported up the contribution limit of the German
social security system. Top-coded wages are
imputed by drawing from a truncated normal
distribution whose moments are generated by
Tobit estimations (see Gartner 2005).
Female Dummy = 1 if female
Highschool degree Dummy = 1 if highschool (upper secondary)
degree
Vocational degree Dummy = 1 if completed vocational training
Vocational plus highschool Dummy = 1 if vocational plus highschool degree
Technical college degree Dummy = 1 if technical college degree
University degree Dummy = 1 if university degree
White-collar Dummy = 1 if white-collar worker
Age Age (in years)
Tenure End of spell date minus date of entry into the
establishment (measured in months)
Foreign Dummy = 1 if nationality Non-German
Table A2: Description of individual characteristics
gained from the Employment Statistics Register
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